Tabletop: extortion and account takeover
An 80-minute exercise for an online retailer. An extortion email threatens a denial of service attack during a launch sale, and the flood that follows covers a wave of customer account takeovers.
It tests opening an incident before anything is down, the payment decision, an exposed origin server, and a watch on the rest of the estate during the flood. It also tests splitting off a second incident, freezes and session revocation, support desk resets, and press questions.
The organizations and every detail below are fictional.
Set up the room
Seat one person in each position: Incident Commander, Operations, Planning, Public Information, Liaison, Legal advisor, Finance/Admin and Intelligence/Investigations, plus one executive for the executive group. Take the Operations Section Chief from the network or site reliability team. A facilitator reads the injects and speaks for the sender, Brightwall and the ISP, and a note-taker records the time of every decision.
The injects compress about four days into 64 minutes, one every eight minutes, followed by a 15-minute hot wash. Keep the "Look for" column away from the players.
The scenario
Halvern Outfitters sells outdoor gear online to about 2 million customer accounts in the United States. Brightwall, a CDN and DDoS mitigation provider, sits in front of the website under an always-on contract. Customers sign in with a password and can add SMS codes.
Halvern has a severity scale, a status page and a decision register. Its support desk can change a customer's email address over the phone. Times are Eastern.
Injects
| Clock | Inject | Look for | Seats tested |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0:00 | Thursday 09:10. An email reaches the security inbox and the chief executive: pay 2 bitcoin by Friday 12:00 or Halvern's site goes down during Friday's launch sale. It promises a 20-minute "demonstration" at 10:00 today. | An Incident Commander takes command and opens the incident at SEV 3, because nothing is down yet. Intelligence/Investigations preserves the note with full headers. Nobody replies. Liaison files at ic3.gov and calls the FBI field office. Operations checks that Brightwall protects every hostname the sale uses. | Incident Commander, Intelligence/Investigations, Liaison, Operations |
| 0:08 | 10:00. An HTTP flood hits the search page and the site slows for 18 minutes. Origin servers run at 95 percent CPU. Brightwall's dashboard shows part of the flood reaching the origin from addresses outside Brightwall's ranges. | Operations concludes the origin address is known. It locks the origin to Brightwall's published ranges and plans a move to a new address before Friday. The Incident Commander raises the incident to SEV 2 and assigns one analyst to watch identity, endpoint and outbound alerts for the length of the attack. | Operations, Incident Commander, Intelligence/Investigations |
| 0:16 | 11:30. The executive group meets. The chief financial officer proposes paying, because the sale carries 30 percent of the quarter's online revenue. | The Legal advisor brings the law enforcement advice not to engage and the Treasury guidance that discourages paying extortion demands. The Incident Commander gives options with their costs: emergency capacity from Brightwall, cached product pages, and a plan for features to turn off first. The decision and who made it go into the decision register. | Legal advisor, Incident Commander, executive group |
| 0:24 | Friday 12:05. A UDP reflection flood fills the internet link, and an HTTP flood hits checkout through Brightwall. The status page still says "All systems normal." | Liaison gives the ISP's network operations center the attacking ports and packet sizes for upstream filtering. Operations adds a rate limit on checkout in count mode first, then blocks. The Public Information Officer posts what customers see and the time of the next update. Every rule goes into the containment record with an owner and an end time. | Liaison, Operations, Public Information Officer |
| 0:32 | 12:40. The analyst on watch reports that the login failure rate rose from 4 percent to 61 percent at 12:10. Logins succeeded on 3,200 accounts from residential proxy addresses, 140 of them changed the email address within minutes, and gift card orders are rising. | The Incident Commander makes account takeover its own group under Operations with its own supervisor. Finance/Admin freezes gift card redemptions and payout changes on the affected accounts. Operations freezes contact detail changes before forcing resets, and revokes sessions and refresh tokens in the same change. | Incident Commander, Operations, Finance/Admin |
| 0:40 | 14:00. Customers call support about reset emails they did not request. An agent changed one account's email address at a caller's request, and that account bought $1,800 in gift cards an hour later. | The Public Information Officer gives support a script that never asks for a password or one-time code. Agents verify callers against details from before the attack. Intelligence/Investigations lists every recovery change an agent made since Thursday and matches each to a verified request. | Public Information Officer, Intelligence/Investigations, Operations |
| 0:48 | Saturday 10:00. A reporter asks whether customer data was stolen and whether Halvern paid. The taken-over accounts show names, addresses and order history. | The Legal advisor starts the breach law assessment from what the accounts show, with a decision time and an owner. The reporter gets the same facts as the status page and customers, and no comment on the payment question beyond the recorded position. | Legal advisor, Public Information Officer |
| 0:56 | Monday 09:00. The floods stopped on Saturday. A new email demands 4 bitcoin to prevent another attack. An executive asks whether the emergency rules can come off before the next sale. | Nobody replies, and Liaison adds the new email to the IC3 complaint. Operations replaces broad blocks with narrow rules and keeps the origin locked. The account takeover group reports before the watch closes. The Incident Commander schedules the review and sends the capacity question to the executive group as a decision with options. | Liaison, Operations, Incident Commander |
Hot wash
Start the hot wash at 1:05. Ask each question, record the answers, and let the note-taker's decision times settle disagreements.
| # | Item |
|---|---|
| 1 | How long from the extortion note to a report at ic3.gov, and who confirmed that nobody replied? |
| 2 | When did the team learn the origin address was exposed, and what changed before Friday because of it? |
| 3 | Who decided on payment, on what advice, and where is the decision recorded? |
| 4 | Did the watch on identity and endpoint alerts run through the flood, and how soon did it report the login spike? |
| 5 | Were sessions and refresh tokens revoked in the same change as the forced resets? |
| 6 | Did support, the status page and the reporter hear the same facts? |
| 7 | Which emergency rules are still in place, and who owns each one's end date? |
Write the findings into the after-action report and improvement plan within a week, with an owner and a date on every action.