Communications and information
Google's Incident Management Guide gives keeping users, stakeholders and leaders informed the same weight as the technical fix.
What every update answers
- What is affected: systems, data, locations, people.
- How bad it is: impact now, and whether it is growing.
- What people should do: workarounds, password resets, channels to avoid.
- When it will be mitigated and resolved, or when the next update comes if nobody knows yet.
Executives get the status summary at fixed times set in the IAP. Every update ends with the time of the next one, including updates with nothing new, so people stop interrupting responders to ask for status. The PIVTR-D T11 template follows this format.
Everything leaving the incident goes through the Public Information Officer, drawn from the same status summary and cleared with counsel where it could create legal exposure. Responders who are asked by anyone outside the organization send them to Public Information or Liaison.
The communications plan
The communications plan says which channel carries what, who is on it, and how anyone confirms who they are talking to. The communications unit in Logistics writes it as the ICS 205 and stands it up, Planning puts it in the IAP, and the IC approves the IAP.
Example
| Purpose | Primary | Backup | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Command bridge | Standing conference line | Out-of-band chat room | IC |
| Operations | Out-of-band chat, one room per group | Conference line | Operations |
| Executive updates | Scheduled call plus written status summary | Phone tree | Public Information |
| Legal and privileged | Counsel's own channel | Phone | Legal advisor |
| Outside parties | Named contacts by phone and email outside the affected domain | Liaison's mobile | Liaison |
Out of band
Assume the attacker can read corporate email and chat until scoping shows otherwise. Run the response on accounts outside the affected identity provider, verify each member by voice before adding them, and keep the roster somewhere offline. Say out loud when the incident moves channels, and why.
Running the virtual command post
In cyber the incident command post is a set of bridges and chat rooms. The communications unit in Logistics hosts them, and keeps them to the discipline of a physical command post: known people, one current status, and a record.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Every room named by one pattern: the incident's short name, then its purpose, such as fr-command and fr-planning in the worked example. Insider cases use the code name | Logistics |
| 2 | Current status pinned at the top of each room: the latest ICS 209 summary, its as-of time and the next update time. Replaced whole at each update | Planning |
| 3 | One command bridge per operational period, with a new link and PIN sent only to that period's roster | Logistics |
| 4 | Recording, transcription and meeting note-taking bots off until counsel sets the recording policy: what is recorded, what never is, and where recordings are kept. A recording or transcript is one more record of privileged discussion to protect, and falls under any legal hold | Legal advisor |
| 5 | Everyone who joins verified by voice or on camera against the roster before the bridge proceeds. Unknown numbers and unnamed participants removed. Roll call repeated after each break | Logistics |
| 6 | People who leave the incident removed from every room and bridge the same day, as part of check-out | Logistics |
| 7 | Decisions made in group rooms brought to the command bridge for the decision register | Incident Commander |
Microsoft reported in March 2022 that the DEV-0537 (LAPSUS$) group joined its targets' crisis communication calls and internal discussion boards, including incident response bridges. It advised an out-of-band plan usable for multiple days, and verifying attendees visually or audibly.
Source: Microsoft Security Blog, DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction, March 22, 2022, checked September 2026.
When the out-of-band channel is compromised
Treat the out-of-band channel as compromised when an unknown participant appears, when the attacker refers to something said only there, or when scoping finds its accounts, administrators or sign-in within the attacker's reach. Announce the move by phone only.
- The Incident Commander starts the phone tree from the offline roster. Each caller confirms the person by voice and gives them the new channel.
- The response moves to the pre-provisioned secondary channel, from a different provider, with accounts that share no identity provider, password or device with the first.
- If the secondary channel is also in doubt, command meets in person at the war room in the communications plan, at a time set on the phone tree.
- The roster is rebuilt on the new channel by voice, one person at a time, from the offline roster.
- The old channel's logs are preserved as evidence, and counsel is told what the attacker may have read.
- The move, its time and its reason go in the decision register, and Logistics issues a new ICS 205.
Pre-provisioning checklist
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Out-of-band chat and conference accounts for every rostered responder, outside the corporate identity provider, with phishing-resistant MFA | Logistics |
| 2 | A secondary channel from a different provider, tested each quarter | Logistics |
| 3 | At least two named administrators for each channel, outside the main IT administrator group | Logistics |
| 4 | A standing conference bridge with a PIN and a lobby, and dial-in numbers that work without the corporate network | Logistics |
| 5 | Roster and phone tree printed and kept by each Command and General Staff member, and tested each quarter | Planning |
| 6 | A war room with badge access, power, a network separate from production, and a printer | Logistics |
| 7 | Guest access ready for the response firm, outside counsel and the insurer, with an end date on every account | Liaison |
| 8 | Recording policy agreed with counsel | Legal advisor |
| 9 | Room naming pattern and pinned status template agreed | Planning |
Common operating picture
NIMS calls this shared view of the incident the common operating picture, and everyone works from it. Planning's Situation unit owns it. In cyber it is the status summary, the attack timeline and the scope list, kept in one place, timestamped, and read by incident command, the crisis team and the executives alike.
Anyone who needs a number takes it from there.
Media
Every media inquiry goes to the Public Information Officer, who logs the time, outlet, reporter, question and deadline, and answers from the approved interim statement until counsel clears a fuller one. Prepare the interim statement before the first call.
The PIVTR-D T18 interim statement and media inquiry log contains both. Staff hear the facts from a notice drawn from the same ICS 209, on PIVTR-D T12, before they read about the incident elsewhere.
A responder called by a reporter takes a name and number and passes them to the Public Information Officer.
Notification deadlines
The Legal advisor owns this list during an incident, and the Public Information Officer drafts the notices the Legal advisor approves, on PIVTR-D T16.
A starter list of common notification deadlines, checked in October and November 2026. Rules change and each depends on facts only counsel can weigh, so counsel confirms which apply before anyone relies on this. Record who decides that each clock has started, because that decision is what starts it.
| Regime | Who tells whom | Deadline | Clock starts | Then |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Banking agencies' incident notification rule (12 CFR Part 53, 225 Subpart N, 304 Subpart C) | Bank or bank holding company to its primary federal regulator: OCC, Federal Reserve or FDIC | As soon as possible, and within 36 hours | The bank determines that a notification incident occurred | Bank service providers tell each affected bank as soon as possible after determining that an incident has materially disrupted or degraded, or is reasonably likely to, covered services for 4 hours or more |
| NCUA, 12 CFR 748.1(c) | Federally insured credit union to NCUA | As soon as possible, and within 72 hours | Reasonably believing a reportable cyber incident occurred, or notice of one from a third party | No sensitive PII or indicators of compromise in the first report |
| SEC Form 8-K, Item 1.05 | US public company to the SEC | 4 business days | The company determines the incident is material, which it must do without unreasonable delay after discovery | An amended 8-K within 4 business days after information missing from the first filing is determined or becomes available |
| SEC Regulation S-P | Broker-dealer, funding portal, investment company, SEC-registered investment adviser or transfer agent to each individual whose sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without authorization | As soon as practicable, and within 30 days | Becoming aware that unauthorized access to or use of customer information occurred or is reasonably likely to have occurred | Service providers must tell the firm within 72 hours. Compliance dates were December 3, 2025 for larger entities and June 3, 2026 for smaller ones |
| GDPR, Articles 33 and 34 | Controller to the supervisory authority, and to data subjects when the risk to them is high | 72 hours to the authority, where feasible. Without undue delay to data subjects | Becoming aware of the breach | Information can follow in phases. A late notice gives the reasons for the delay |
| NIS2, Article 23 | Essential or important entity to its CSIRT or competent authority | 24-hour early warning, 72-hour notification | Becoming aware of a significant incident | Final report 1 month after the notification |
| DORA, Article 19, and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301 | EU financial entity to its competent authority | 4 hours after classifying the incident as major, and within 24 hours of becoming aware | Classification as a major ICT-related incident | Intermediate report within 72 hours of the initial notification, final report within 1 month of the latest intermediate report |
| Cyber Resilience Act, Article 14 | Manufacturer of a product with digital elements, through ENISA's single reporting platform, to its coordinating CSIRT and ENISA | 24-hour early warning, 72-hour notification | Becoming aware of an actively exploited vulnerability or a severe incident. Applies from September 11, 2026 | Final report 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available for a vulnerability, or 1 month after the notification for an incident |
| NYDFS Part 500.17 | Covered entity to the Superintendent | 72 hours. 24 hours after any extortion payment | Determining that a cybersecurity incident occurred at the covered entity, an affiliate or a third-party service provider | Written explanation of an extortion payment within 30 days: why it was necessary, the alternatives considered and the diligence performed |
| HIPAA Breach Notification Rule | Covered entity to individuals, HHS and, for more than 500 residents of a state or jurisdiction, the media | Without unreasonable delay, and within 60 calendar days | Discovery of the breach | Breaches of 500 or more go to HHS at the same time as the individual notices. Breaches of fewer than 500 go to HHS within 60 days after the end of the calendar year of discovery. Business associates tell the covered entity within the same 60-day limit |
| FTC Health Breach Notification Rule, 16 CFR 318 | Vendor of personal health records or related entity not covered by HIPAA to individuals, the FTC and, for 500 or more residents of one state, the media | Without unreasonable delay, and within 60 calendar days | Discovery of a breach of security, which includes an unauthorized disclosure | The FTC at the same time as individuals for 500 or more; within 60 days after the end of the calendar year for fewer |
| DFARS 252.204-7012 | Defense contractor to DoD, through dibnet.dod.mil | 72 hours | Discovery of the incident | Keep images and packet captures at least 90 days after the report |
| CISA Federal Incident Notification Guidelines and OMB M-25-04 | Federal civilian agency to CISA, and for a major incident to CISA, OMB, its Inspector General and Congress | 1 hour to CISA. 1 hour to CISA and OMB after a major incident determination. 7 days to Congress and the Inspector General | Identification by the agency's top-level SOC, CSIRT or IT department. For Congress, a reasonable basis to conclude a major incident occurred | Updates as facts arrive. A breach that is a major incident needs a report to Congress within 30 days of discovery |
| NISPOM, 32 CFR 117.8(f) | Cleared defense contractor to DCSA | Immediately | A cyber incident on a classified information system DCSA approved | Report the technique, a malware sample if isolated, and DoD program information potentially compromised |
| FCC CPNI breach rule, 47 CFR 64.2011 | Telecommunications carrier to the Secret Service and FBI, through the FCC's central reporting facility | As soon as practicable, and within 7 business days | Reasonably determining that a breach of customer proprietary network information (CPNI) occurred | Customers after the law enforcement notice, once 7 full business days have passed unless an exception applies. The 2024 amendments add the FCC, a 30-day customer deadline and a harm-based exception. The eCFR text, current to October 23, 2026, does not include them and links to them as a pending amendment, and this page found no FCC notice of an effective date. On July 31, 2026, the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and vacated the August 2025 panel decision that upheld them. The full court heard argument on October 21, 2026, and no en banc opinion had been published by November 10, 2026 |
| TSA security directives | Freight rail, passenger rail, transit and pipeline owners and operators to CISA | Rail and transit: as soon as practicable, and within 72 hours. Pipeline: as soon as practicable, and within 24 hours | Identifying a reportable cybersecurity incident | TSA states the 72-hour rail and transit rule in its September 1, 2026 notice; the 24-hour pipeline rule dates from Pipeline-2021-01B. TSA reissues the directives each year. Confirm against the current version on the TSA security directives page |
| CIRCIA | Covered critical infrastructure entity to CISA | 72 hours, and 24 hours after a ransom payment | Reasonably believing a covered incident occurred | Not in force until CISA publishes the final rule. CISA sent it to OMB for review on October 1, 2026, and this page found no publication by November 2, 2026. Reporting starts only after the final rule takes effect. Check CISA for its status |
| NERC CIP-008-6, Requirement R4 | Electric Responsible Entity with high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems to the E-ISAC and CISA | 1 hour for a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. By the end of the next calendar day for an attempt to compromise | The entity determines, under its own process, that the incident is reportable or was an attempt to compromise | Updates within 7 calendar days of each new or changed attribute: functional impact, attack vector, level of intrusion. CIP-008-7.1, approved by FERC Order No. 919 on March 19, 2026, takes effect July 1, 2028, or earlier for an entity that adopts it early |
| Form DOE-417, Electric Emergency Incident and Disturbance Report | Balancing authorities, reliability coordinators, electric utilities and some generating entities to DOE | 1 hour for criteria 1 to 9, including a Reportable Cyber Security Incident or a cyber event that interrupts electrical system operations. 6 hours for criteria 10 to 13 | The incident | Final report within 72 hours of the incident. An attempted compromise (criterion 14) is due by the end of the next calendar day after determination. Shared with E-ISAC and CISA through line W, the form can satisfy CIP-008 |
| NRC, 10 CFR 73.77 | Nuclear power plant licensee to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center by telephone | 1 hour after discovery of a cyber attack that adversely impacted safety, security or emergency preparedness functions. 4 hours if it could have. 8 hours for signs of pre-attack planning | Discovery of the cyber attack, or receipt of the information | Record in the corrective action program within 24 hours. Written follow-up on NRC Form 366 within 60 days of the telephone notice for the 1-hour and most 4-hour events |
| Coast Guard MTS cyber rule (33 CFR 101.620(b), 101.650(g)) | Owner or operator of an MTSA vessel, facility or outer continental shelf facility to the National Response Center (NRC) | Without delay | A reportable cyber incident: one that leads, or could reasonably lead, to substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability of a covered system, or to a transportation security incident | In force since July 16, 2025. The duty applies to entities that have not reported to the Coast Guard under 33 CFR 6.16-1 or are not subject to it. Under 33 CFR 6.16-1, evidence of an actual or threatened cyber incident at any vessel, harbor, port or waterfront facility goes immediately to the FBI, CISA and the Captain of the Port. NVIC 02-24 Change 1 says an NRC report reaches the Captain of the Port and the FBI, and CISA needs its own report |
| New York General Municipal Law Article 19-c | Municipal corporation, including a school district or BOCES, or public authority to the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (DHSES) | 72 hours. 24 hours after a ransom payment | Reasonably believing that a cybersecurity incident occurred (995-b). For the 24-hour notice, the ransom payment (995-c) | Written explanation within 30 days of a ransom payment (995-c): why payment was necessary, the amount, how it was paid, alternatives considered, and diligence on alternatives and on compliance with state and federal rules, including OFAC's. Reports are exempt from FOIL under General Municipal Law 995-b(3) |
| FBI CJIS Security Policy v6.1, IR-6 | Staff to the agency's incident response capability. The agency reports incident information to its incident handlers, to the CJIS Systems Officer, SIB Chief or Interface Agency Official, and to the FBI CJIS ISO | 1 hour | Discovery of a suspected incident affecting criminal justice information | IR-6 in v6.1 (June 25, 2026) says "immediately but not to exceed one (1) hour after discovery". Local agencies follow their CJIS Systems Agency's form |
| IRS Publication 1075 | Agency receiving federal tax information to TIGTA and the IRS Office of Safeguards | Immediately, and within 24 hours | Identifying a possible issue involving FTI | Do not wait for an internal investigation. Tell Safeguards before notifying taxpayers and share media releases first. A 2026 draft revision is pending |
| Federal Student Aid breach report (SAIG enrollment agreement, GENERAL-24-46) | Title IV institution, through its Destination Point Administrator or GLBA Qualified Individual, to Federal Student Aid on the Cybersecurity Breach Intake Form | 24 hours | The incident is known or identified | Other SAIG organizations, such as servicers, email support@fps.ed.gov. The form asks whether the breach is suspected or known |
| FTC Safeguards Rule, 16 CFR 314.4(j) | Financial institution under FTC jurisdiction to the FTC, on its online form | As soon as possible, and within 30 days | Discovery of unauthorized acquisition of unencrypted customer information of 500 or more consumers | Unauthorized access is presumed acquisition without reliable evidence otherwise. A law enforcement request can delay FTC public disclosure up to 30 days, then up to 60 more. Title IV institutions agree in their Program Participation Agreement to follow the Safeguards Rule |
| US state breach laws | Organization to affected residents, and often the state attorney general | Varies. California, Colorado, Florida and Washington set 30 days | Discovery of the breach, in most states | Attorney general thresholds vary, often at 500 residents |
| Cyber insurance policy | Insured to the carrier | The policy's notice clause | Usually discovery | Panel vendors may be required. Read the policy before an incident |
Sources checked November 2026 for the energy, maritime, state and local government and education rows: FERC letter order approving CIP-008-6 (84 FR, June 26, 2019); FERC Order No. 919 for the July 1, 2028 date; Form DOE-417 and instructions (OMB 1901-0288); eCFR 10 CFR 73.77; Coast Guard final rule, 90 FR 6298 (January 17, 2025) and NVIC 02-24 Change 1; New York DHSES reporting page and General Municipal Law 995-b and 995-c; FBI CJIS Security Policy v6.1 (June 25, 2026), control IR-6, at le.fbi.gov, and California DOJ bulletin 2026-ISRS-001; IRS reporting page for Publication 1075; FSA GENERAL-24-46 and the SAIG agreement form (OMB 1845-0002); 16 CFR 314.4(j) (FR Doc. 2023-24412). Also checked November 2026: eCFR 47 CFR 64.2011, current to October 23, 2026, and the Sixth Circuit docket for Ohio Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, No. 24-3133, on CourtListener, which records the en banc argument on October 21, 2026. Sources checked October 2026: DFARS 252.204-7012 (May 2024) at acquisition.gov; eCFR 32 CFR 117.8; CISA Federal Incident Notification Guidelines; California Civil Code 1798.82(a)(2), Colorado's attorney general data protection page, Florida Statutes 501.171 and Washington RCW 19.255.010; eCFR 12 CFR Part 53, 12 CFR 748.1, 17 CFR 248.30, 45 CFR Part 164 Subpart D and 16 CFR Part 318; the SEC's Regulation S-P compliance guide and Item 1.05 compliance guide; GDPR Article 33; NIS2 Article 23; Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, Article 5; ENISA, The CRA Single Reporting Platform is launched, September 11, 2026; 23 NYCRR 500.17; OMB M-25-04; 47 CFR 64.2011 (October 1, 2025 edition) and 89 FR 9968; the Sixth Circuit's en banc order in Ohio Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, July 31, 2026, which Public Citizen reports vacated the panel decision; the current 47 CFR 64.2011 text at LII; TSA's September 1, 2026 notice and January 17, 2025 ratification of the pipeline directives; CISA's CIRCIA page, and Covington's report of the OMB submission (October 8, 2026), and Paubox, Cyber incident reporting rule reaches final White House review (October 14, 2026).
Writing it down
- Use plain language, with no acronyms outside the glossary.
- Give every time with its time zone.
- Requests and decisions that must survive the incident go on a general message (ICS 213).
- Everyone in a role keeps an activity log (ICS 214).