Worked example
The tabletop exercise run through as filled-in forms, so you can see what a finished form looks like before you have to write one. Northgate Supply, its people and every detail here are fictional. Times are Central.
Timeline
| Time | What happened |
|---|---|
| Fri 02:10 | EDR flags mass file renames on two file servers. The on-call analyst, Dana Ruiz, verifies the alert and takes command. |
| 02:18 | Dana isolates both servers in EDR, within her standing authority. |
| 02:40 | Ransom notes appear on 30 more servers. A domain administrator account is signing in from an unmanaged host. |
| 02:50 | Dana finishes the ICS 201. At 02:55 she briefs the on-call Incident Commander, Sam Okafor, on the out-of-band bridge. |
| 03:00 | Command transfers to Sam. He confirms SEV 1, sizes the incident at Type 3 and names Operations and Planning Section Chiefs. |
| 03:05 | Sam gives the executive on call the first update by phone, inside the SEV 1 deadline of one hour from detection. Updates follow every 30 minutes while encryption continues. |
| 03:40 | No new encryption. The incident is mitigated, and executive updates move to every 2 hours, the next at 04:30. |
| 06:30 | Planning issues the first ICS 209. Every executive update from here is drawn from it, the next at 08:30. |
| 07:00 | Day period starts. Command transfers to the day Incident Commander, Rachel Kim, and Sam goes off shift to rest. |
| 07:40 | Diane Foster, the executive on call, answers Rachel's ICS 213. The executive group decided at 07:15 to keep the packing lines running, and Diane approves an outside response firm up to $250,000. |
| 11:00 | The outside response firm is engaged with the insurer's approval, and the incident becomes Type 2. |
| 12:00 | Diane signs a delegation of authority for this incident to both Incident Commanders. |
| 13:00 | The tactics meeting for the night period produces the ICS 215. The Safety Officer finishes the ICS 215A at 14:15, before the planning meeting. |
| 16:00 | Rachel approves the Incident Action Plan for the night period. |
| 18:30 | Operations briefing for the night shift. Sam takes command back for the night by transfer at 19:00. |
| Sun 09:00 | A scoping pass finds a second persistence mechanism on two restored order entry servers. The board update that afternoon reports it. |
The forms
The ICS 201 and the transfer record come from the first hour. The ICS 209 is the first status summary, and the ICS 213 records the executive's answers to the decisions it asked for.
The delegation of authority follows the move to Type 2, and the ICS 215 and 215A come from the tactics meeting. The cover sheet, the ICS 202, 203 and 204s, the ICS 205 communications plan and the ICS 208 safety message make up the Incident Action Plan for the first night.
The 14:30 ICS 209 is attached as its situation summary. The day shift's chiefs prepare it, because each shift plans the other shift's period, and the night chiefs run it. The last form is the ICS 209 that went to the board on day 3.
ICS 201, prepared at 02:50
INCIDENT BRIEFING (after ICS 201)
Incident name: FRIDAY RENAME Incident number: IR-2026-0142
Prepared by: Dana Ruiz, SOC analyst Date, time, time zone: Fri 02:50 CT
Incident Commander: Dana Ruiz, until transfer
Severity: SEV 1 (Critical), declared 02:50
1. Situation
02:10 EDR flagged mass renames on FS01 and FS02 (Chicago data center).
02:40 ransom notes found on 30 more servers in Chicago and Dallas.
Domain admin account adm-jwells has been signing in from unmanaged
host 10.20.14.77 since 01:52.
Known: 32 servers show encryption. One domain admin account is in
the attacker's hands.
Not known: initial access, whether data left, whether backups are
touched, whether the plant is affected.
2. Current objectives
1. No new encryption on any host after 04:00, confirmed in EDR.
2. Backup repositories confirmed intact and out of reach of
production credentials by 05:00.
3. Every compromised account disabled, with sessions revoked,
by 06:00.
3. Actions taken so far
Time Action By
02:14 Command taken, incident opened, activity log D. Ruiz
02:18 FS01 and FS02 isolated in EDR D. Ruiz
02:41 Ransom notes confirmed on 30 servers D. Ruiz
02:44 Out-of-band bridge opened, on-call IC paged D. Ruiz
02:47 adm-jwells disabled in AD, sessions revoked D. Ruiz
02:49 Legal on call paged D. Ruiz
4. Current organization
IC: Dana Ruiz
Operations: Dana Ruiz
Planning, Public Information, Liaison, Legal advisor: not filled
5. Resources assigned and ordered
Resource Assigned to Status
EDR console D. Ruiz In use
On-call IC (S. Okafor) Command Paged 02:44, on bridge 02:55
Server team on call Operations Paged 02:48
Legal on call Command Paged 02:49
IR retainer Not activated Needs IC decision
6. Safety and wellbeing
Dana on shift since 23:00 Thursday. Plant systems not assessed.
Nobody acts on plant systems without engineering sign-off.
7. Next briefing: 02:55, out-of-band bridgeTransfer of command, 03:00
TRANSFER OF COMMAND
Outgoing IC: Dana Ruiz Incoming IC: Sam Okafor
Effective (date, time, time zone): Fri 03:00 CT
Briefed from: ICS 201
Covered:
Situation and scope yes
Objectives and progress yes, all three open
Organization, and who is on shift yes
Open decisions retainer activation, plant
Commitments made to outside parties none yet
Safety and wellbeing Dana relieved at 07:00;
Sam relieved by day IC at 07:00
Next meetings and updates first executive update 03:05,
then every 30 minutes
Announced to: all responders, on the out-of-band bridge
Logged by: Dana Ruiz, 03:01ICS 209, as of 06:30
INCIDENT STATUS SUMMARY (after ICS 209)
As of (date, time, time zone): Fri 06:30 CT
Incident name and number: FRIDAY RENAME, IR-2026-0142
Severity: SEV 1 Type: 3
Incident Commander: Sam Okafor
What is affected: 32 servers encrypted across both data centers.
Order entry, warehouse management and shipping labels are down.
Email and chat work but are treated as visible to the attacker.
Packing lines run. Their operator screens show the ransom note.
How bad it is: Shipping stopped at 03:00. No new encryption since
03:40. Not growing.
What people should do now: Use the manual shipping process. Stay
off servers. Report anything unusual by phone to the service desk.
When it will be mitigated and resolved, if known: Not yet known.
First restore estimate at the 12:30 update.
Scope: systems affected confirmed 32 suspected 6
accounts confirmed 1 suspected 3
Containment status: Encryption stopped 03:40. adm-jwells disabled
02:47. Internet egress restricted 03:30. Backups confirmed
isolated 04:50.
Objectives this period, and progress on each:
1. No new encryption after 04:00: met at 03:40.
2. Backups confirmed intact and isolated by 05:00: met at 04:50.
3. Compromised accounts disabled by 06:00: not met, 1 of 4 done.
New time proposed: 09:00.
Outside parties engaged: outside counsel from the insurer's
approved panel (04:30).
Notifications made, and due: none made. Counsel is assessing.
Insurer to be called at 08:00 by Finance/Admin.
Decisions needed from leadership:
1. Approve engaging an outside response firm, up to $250,000.
2. Keep the packing lines running on manual monitoring, or stop them.
Next update: 08:30ICS 213, executive decisions at 07:40
GENERAL MESSAGE (after ICS 213)
To: Diane Foster Position: Chief Operating Officer,
executive on call
From: Rachel Kim Position: Incident Commander
Subject: FRIDAY RENAME, IR-2026-0142. Two decisions from the 06:30
ICS 209
Date, time, time zone: Fri 07:05 CT
Message:
1. Outside response firm. Scope, initial access and data theft need
more analysts than the two we have. I request approval to engage
an outside firm, up to $250,000. My limit under the standing
delegation is $25,000. Finance/Admin calls the insurer at 08:00,
and the policy may require a firm from its panel. I recommend
approval now, with the firm chosen with counsel after that call.
2. Packing lines. The operator screens show the ransom note, and the
lines run. Plant engineering reports that the safety systems are
hardwired and independent of the affected network.
A: keep the lines running, with plant engineering watching each
line and free to stop it.
B: stop the lines until engineering has checked the controllers,
about 8 hours with no packing.
I recommend A.
Reply:
1. Approved at 07:40, up to $250,000. Choose the firm with counsel
after the insurer call, from the insurer's panel if the policy
requires it. Counsel engages the firm.
2. A, as the executive group decided at 07:15. The lines keep running
under manual monitoring. Plant engineering may stop a line at any
time without asking.
Replied by: Diane Foster, Chief Operating Officer
Date, time: Fri 07:40 CTDelegation of authority, 12:00
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
Incident name, or "standing, all incidents": FRIDAY RENAME,
IR-2026-0142
Delegated by (Agency Administrator, name and title): Diane Foster,
Chief Operating Officer
Delegated to (Incident Commander): Rachel Kim for day periods and
Sam Okafor for night periods, each while in command by transfer
Effective from (date, time, time zone): Fri 12:00 CT
until: the incident is closed, or this delegation is revoked in
writing
The Incident Commander has full authority to manage this incident,
within these limits:
May isolate or shut down without further approval: any server,
workstation, account, network segment or internet connection
outside the plant network
Must get approval from the Agency Administrator to: stop the packing
lines or change the plant network, shut down a whole data center,
contact or pay the attacker, or take a restored system back out of
service for more than 4 hours
Spending authority, up to: $50,000 for any one commitment. The
Halyard IR engagement is approved separately, up to $250,000
(ICS 213, Fri 07:40).
May activate retainers and outside help: yes
May engage law enforcement: yes, with counsel
Priorities from the Agency Administrator:
1. Safety of people and of the plant.
2. Shipping restored, starting with order entry and shipping labels.
3. Evidence preserved, and every notification deadline met as
counsel directs.
Constraints (systems, times, messages not to touch): No action on
plant systems without engineering sign-off. No contact with the
attacker. Encrypted servers stay powered on and isolated until
counsel releases them.
Public communications: who approves, and what the Agency
Administrator sees first: the Public Information Officer drafts,
counsel clears and the Incident Commander approves. I see every
statement before it leaves the company. The chief executive approves
any statement about data taken.
How and when the Agency Administrator will review the incident: daily
at 17:00 with the Incident Commander, and at any change of severity
or type.
Report to the Agency Administrator: what when
ICS 209 every 2 hours while SEV 1
Approved Incident Action Plan each period, when signed
Any decision above these limits at once, by ICS 213
Agency Administrator contact, and backup, out of hours: Diane Foster,
(312) 555-0150. Backup: Victor Lane, Chief Financial Officer,
(312) 555-0151.
Signed (Agency Administrator): Diane Foster Date: Fri 12:00 CT
Accepted (Incident Commander): Rachel Kim Date: Fri 12:05 CT
Accepted (Incident Commander): Sam Okafor Date: Fri 18:40 CTICS 215, tactics meeting at 13:00
OPERATIONAL PLANNING WORKSHEET (after ICS 215)
Incident name: FRIDAY RENAME, IR-2026-0142
Operational period: Fri 19:00 to Sat 07:00 CT
Built at the tactics meeting, Fri 13:00 CT. Everyone reports to the
Operations room at 18:15 for the 18:30 briefing.
Group or division: Containment group Supervisor: Priya Das
Objective served: 2
Work assignment: reset KRBTGT at 20:00 and 06:00, rotate Tier 0
credentials, revoke sessions, keep the egress allow list
People and tools required have need
Identity engineers 2 2 0
Network engineers 2 2 0
Clean admin workstations 4 2 2
Report to Planning at: 22:00, 02:00, 06:00
Group or division: Rebuild group Supervisor: Jen Alvarez
Objective served: 3
Work assignment: restore order entry and shipping label servers
from backups dated before initial access, in the isolated
recovery network, and get owner sign-off
People and tools required have need
Server engineers 4 2 2
Application engineers 2 2 0
Recovery network hosts 3 2 1
Report to Planning at: 22:00, 02:00, 06:00
Group or division: Investigation group Supervisor: Chris Boyd
Objectives served: 1 and 3
Work assignment: establish initial access and its date, hunt every
host and account, establish whether data left and when
People and tools required have need
Halyard IR analysts 3 3 0
Internal analysts 2 2 0
Evidence drives, 8 TB 6 2 4
Report to Planning at: 22:00, 02:00, 06:00
Totals required have need
People 15 13 2
Clean admin workstations 4 2 2
Recovery network hosts 3 2 1
Evidence drives, 8 TB 6 2 4
Resource orders to Logistics at 13:50: every item in the need column,
on site by 18:15.
Prepared by (day Operations Section Chief, with Planning): Nadia Karim
with Paul Weber, Fri 13:45 CTICS 215A, prepared at 14:15
IAP SAFETY ANALYSIS (after ICS 215A)
Incident name: FRIDAY RENAME, IR-2026-0142
Operational period: Fri 19:00 to Sat 07:00 CT
Prepared at: Fri 14:15 CT, from the 13:00 tactics meeting
Group or division Work assignment
Containment group KRBTGT resets, Tier 0 rotation, session
revocation, egress allow list
Risk to people: the second KRBTGT reset falls at 06:00, in the last
hour of the shift.
Risk to physical process: rotation could lock out accounts that
plant systems use and stop line monitoring.
Risk to evidence: account and rule changes overwrite the state the
investigation needs.
Risk to business: backup jobs and hypervisor management stop if a
service account is missed.
Mitigation: a second engineer reads back every reset. Plant
engineering checks the rotation list before 20:00. Every change is
exported to the evidence share before it runs. Backup and
hypervisor owners on call 20:00 to 22:00.
Approved by: Nadia Karim. Plant item: plant engineering on call.
Rebuild group Restore order entry and shipping label servers in
the isolated recovery network
Risk to people: night work in the data centers.
Risk to physical process: none. The recovery network has no route
to the plant.
Risk to evidence: an encrypted server wiped or reused for a restore.
Risk to business: a backup that contains the attacker's tools puts
them back in production.
Mitigation: work in pairs in the data centers. Restore to new hosts
only, and leave encrypted servers powered on and isolated. Restore
only backups the Investigation group has dated before initial
access, and pass the pre-restoration checks before any connection.
Approved by: Nadia Karim.
Investigation group Initial access, hunt, data theft
Risk to people: Halyard IR staff who fly in this afternoon cannot
also work the night, because travel counts as duty.
Risk to physical process: none. The hunt covers the two data
centers.
Risk to evidence: collection tools change the hosts they run on.
Risk to business: a finding that data left can start notification
clocks.
Mitigation: Halyard staffs the night with three analysts who have
not worked today. Its staff who fly in rest at the hotel Logistics
booked and start with the Saturday day period. Memory before disk,
every collection logged, every image hashed into the evidence
register. Findings go to counsel first, and counsel records when
each clock starts.
Approved by: Nadia Karim. Evidence and clocks: Marcus Hale.
Prepared by (day Safety Officer): Irene Walsh, Fri 14:15 CT
Reviewed by (day Operations Section Chief): Nadia Karim, Fri 14:20 CTIAP cover sheet, night period
INCIDENT ACTION PLAN
Incident name: FRIDAY RENAME Incident number: IR-2026-0142
Operational period: from Fri 19:00 CT to Sat 07:00 CT
Contents:
ICS 202 Incident objectives
ICS 203 Organization assignment list
ICS 204 Assignment lists: Containment group, Rebuild group,
Investigation group
ICS 205 Communications plan
ICS 208 Safety message
Situation summary (current ICS 209): as of Fri 14:30 CT
Working papers kept by Planning: ICS 215, ICS 215A
Prepared by (day Planning Section Chief): Paul Weber Time: Fri 15:40
Approved by (IC or each unified command member): Rachel Kim
Time: Fri 16:00
Distributed to: Command and General Staff, the three group supervisors
and the executive on call, at 16:15 in #fr-planning. Printed copies
in the Operations room for the 18:30 briefing.ICS 202, night period
INCIDENT OBJECTIVES (after ICS 202)
Incident name: FRIDAY RENAME, IR-2026-0142
Operational period: from Fri 19:00 CT to Sat 07:00 CT
Objectives, each with an outcome, a measure and a time:
1. Scope confirmed for both data centers, every affected host and
account listed with evidence, by 06:00 Saturday.
2. Tier 0 credentials rotated (KRBTGT twice, domain admins, backup
and hypervisor admins) with sessions revoked by 06:30 Saturday,
and no attacker authentication in the 30 minutes after.
3. Order entry and shipping label servers restored from backups
dated before initial access, and accepted by their owners, by
07:00 Saturday.
Command emphasis (priorities, constraints, risk tolerance):
Preserve evidence before any rebuild. No action on plant systems
without engineering sign-off. No contact with the attacker. Counsel
directs the investigation.
Decisions made since the last IAP, and by whom:
07:15 executive group: packing lines keep running under manual
monitoring.
07:40 executive on call: outside response firm approved, up to
$250,000.
11:00 Halyard IR engaged with the insurer's approval. Type 2.
12:00 executive on call: delegation of authority signed for this
incident.
Safety and wellbeing message:
12-hour operational periods, and no more than 13 hours on duty
including briefing and handover. Nobody works two periods in a row.
Attached: organization list, assignment lists, communications plan,
safety message, situation summary
Approved by (IC or each unified command member): Rachel Kim
Time: Fri 16:00ICS 203, night period
ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT LIST (after ICS 203)
Operational period: Fri 19:00 to Sat 07:00 CT
Command
Incident Commander: Sam Okafor
Deputy: none
Public Information Officer: Grace Lin
Safety Officer: Luis Ortega
Liaison Officer: Ellen Shaw
Legal advisor: Marcus Hale (outside counsel)
Operations Section Chief: Omar Haddad
Group, supervisor, members:
Containment group, Priya Das, 4
Rebuild group, Jen Alvarez, 6
Investigation group, Chris Boyd (Halyard IR), 5
Planning Section Chief: Tom Reilly
Situation unit: Ana Petrov
Resources unit: Tom Reilly
Documentation unit: Ben Cho
Logistics Section Chief: Raj Patel
Finance/Admin Section Chief: Kim Osei (on call)
Intelligence/Investigations (if separate): in Operations this period
Unified command members (if used): not usedICS 204, Containment group
ASSIGNMENT LIST (after ICS 204)
Operational period: Fri 19:00 to Sat 07:00 CT
Group or division: Containment group Supervisor: Priya Das
Members: 4, identity and network engineers
Work assignment, and the objective each task serves:
1. Reset KRBTGT twice, 10 hours apart, first reset at 20:00.
(objective 2)
2. Rotate domain admin, backup and hypervisor admin credentials in
one window after the first KRBTGT reset. (objective 2)
3. Revoke sessions for all rotated accounts and watch sign-in logs
for two hours. (objective 2)
4. Keep internet egress restricted to the allow list. (all)
Special instructions (change windows, systems not to touch, evidence
handling): Do not touch plant systems. Export every rule and
account change to the evidence share before making it.
Status to Planning at: 22:00, 02:00, 06:00 via: Operations room
Channels: primary out-of-band chat backup bridge line
Prepared by (day Resources unit, with the day Operations Section Chief):
Paul Weber with Nadia KarimICS 204, Rebuild group
ASSIGNMENT LIST (after ICS 204)
Operational period: Fri 19:00 to Sat 07:00 CT
Group or division: Rebuild group Supervisor: Jen Alvarez
Members: 6, server and application engineers
Work assignment, and the objective each task serves:
1. Restore order entry servers from the backup set dated before
initial access, in the isolated recovery network. (objective 3)
2. Restore shipping label servers the same way. (objective 3)
3. Run the pre-restoration checks and get owner sign-off before
connecting anything to production. (objective 3)
Special instructions (change windows, systems not to touch, evidence
handling): Restore only from backups the Investigation group has
dated. Leave encrypted servers powered on and isolated as evidence.
Status to Planning at: 22:00, 02:00, 06:00 via: Operations room
Channels: primary out-of-band chat backup bridge line
Prepared by (day Resources unit, with the day Operations Section Chief):
Paul Weber with Nadia KarimICS 204, Investigation group
ASSIGNMENT LIST (after ICS 204)
Operational period: Fri 19:00 to Sat 07:00 CT
Group or division: Investigation group Supervisor: Chris Boyd, Halyard IR
Members: 5 (3 Halyard, 2 internal)
Work assignment, and the objective each task serves:
1. Establish initial access and its date, and tell the Rebuild group
which backups predate it. (objectives 1 and 3)
2. Hunt every host and account for the incident's indicators, and
list each with evidence. (objective 1)
3. Establish whether data left, and when. (objective 1)
Special instructions (change windows, systems not to touch, evidence
handling): Findings go to counsel first. Every image hashed and
entered in the evidence register.
Status to Planning at: 22:00, 02:00, 06:00 via: Operations room
Channels: primary out-of-band chat backup bridge line
Prepared by (day Resources unit, with the day Operations Section Chief):
Paul Weber with Nadia KarimICS 205, night period
COMMUNICATIONS PLAN (after ICS 205)
Incident name: FRIDAY RENAME, IR-2026-0142
Operational period: Fri 19:00 to Sat 07:00 CT
Treat corporate email, chat and identity as compromised until scoping
shows otherwise.
Purpose Primary Backup Owner
Command bridge Out-of-band bridge #fr-command, then Sam Okafor
backup bridge
Operations Out-of-band chat, Out-of-band bridge Omar Haddad
room per group
Executive updates ICS 209 by email, Phone tree Grace Lin
call for decisions
Legal, privileged Counsel's bridge, Counsel's mobile Marcus Hale
#fr-legal
Outside parties Liaison, by phone Liaison's mobile Ellen Shaw
Plant engineering Phone only Plant control room Luis Ortega
Channel details (every number is area code 312):
Out-of-band bridge 555-0100, access code 604 118
Backup bridge 555-0101, access code 227 950, second provider
Out-of-band chat workspace northgate-ir, outside company sign-on.
Rooms #fr-command, #fr-planning,
#fr-containment, #fr-rebuild,
#fr-investigation, and #fr-legal for counsel,
the IC and Chris Boyd
Email ir-status@northgate-ir.example, for ICS 209s
Executive call 555-0102, at update times when a decision is due
Counsel's bridge 555-0103
Plant engineering on call 555-0160, control room 555-0161
Accounts issued by Logistics after a voice check, each
with an end date. Halyard IR accounts end after
7 days unless renewed.
Phone tree, used when the bridge and the chat both fail, or on recall:
Sam Okafor (IC), 555-0111, calls Command and General Staff:
Omar Haddad 555-0121 Tom Reilly 555-0122 Raj Patel 555-0123
Luis Ortega 555-0124 Grace Lin 555-0125 Ellen Shaw 555-0126
Marcus Hale 555-0127 Kim Osei 555-0128
Omar Haddad calls the group supervisors:
Priya Das 555-0131 Jen Alvarez 555-0132 Chris Boyd 555-0133
Each supervisor calls their group from the offline roster.
Grace Lin calls the executive on call, Diane Foster, 555-0150
(backup Victor Lane, 555-0151).
Luis Ortega calls plant engineering on call, 555-0160.
Every call ends with a read-back of the new channel and the next time.
Test at 19:30. Target: every group reached within 15 minutes.
Roster kept at (offline): printed in the Operations room binder, and on
2 Logistics laptops outside the domain. Planning updates it at each
check-in (ICS 211).
How members verify each other: a call back on the roster number before
anyone joins a room or a bridge. The IC gives a code word for this
period at the 18:30 briefing, spoken only. An email or chat request
alone never adds anyone.
Status cadence: groups to Planning at 22:00, 02:00 and 06:00, in the
Operations room. ICS 209 to the executive on call at 20:30, 22:30, 00:30,
02:30, 04:30 and 06:30. Every change of channel is announced on the
bridge and in #fr-command, with the reason.
Special instructions: no incident traffic on company email, chat,
softphones or single sign-on. No ransom note photos in any channel.
Prepared by (day Logistics, communications unit): Dev Mehta
Date, time: Fri 15:00 CTICS 208, night period
SAFETY MESSAGE (after ICS 208)
Incident name: FRIDAY RENAME, IR-2026-0142
Operational period: Fri 19:00 to Sat 07:00 CT
Hazards this period, control, and who checks:
1. Fatigue. Sam Okafor and 3 Containment group members worked
Friday 03:00 to 07:00 and have had one rest period since.
Control: 13 hours on duty at most, 18:30 to 07:30. Nobody on this
shift works the Saturday day period.
Who checks: Luis Ortega, against the ICS 211 at 23:00 and 03:00.
2. Errors late in the shift. The second KRBTGT reset falls at 06:00.
Control: a second engineer reads back every reset, deletion and
rotation before it runs.
Who checks: Priya Das.
3. Reconnecting an isolated server by mistake, which can let the
attacker back in and damage evidence.
Control: only the Operations Section Chief lifts EDR isolation on
an encrypted server, and only with counsel's release. Restored
servers join production after the pre-restoration checks and
owner sign-off.
Who checks: Omar Haddad.
4. Exposing new credentials. A rotated Tier 0 password typed on an
unclean host goes straight back to the attacker.
Control: Tier 0 work from the clean administrative workstations
only.
Who checks: Priya Das.
5. Lone work in the data centers at night.
Control: work in pairs. Call the Operations room on arrival and
on leaving.
Who checks: Tom Reilly, Resources unit.
Maximum shift length: 13 hours on duty, with briefing and handover
Relief roster at: Operations room binder and #fr-planning
Physical processes or OT at risk: yes. The packing lines run under
manual monitoring (executive group, 07:15). Plant engineering reports
that the safety systems are hardwired and independent of the
affected network.
Actions that need engineering sign-off first: any change on the
plant network or its boundary firewall, any EDR action on a plant
host, and disabling or rotating any account that plant systems use.
Plant engineering may stop a line at any time. On call: 555-0160.
Wellbeing: rest, food, travel, who to call: Logistics brings meals to
the Operations room at 23:30 and 04:00. A quiet room is next door.
Anyone who has worked 12 hours goes home by taxi on the incident cost
code. Anyone the attacker contacts or names tells the Safety Officer,
and HR support is on call. Employee assistance program: 555-0195.
Safety Officer: Luis Ortega, 555-0124. All numbers area code 312.
Prepared by (day Safety Officer): Irene Walsh Date, time: Fri 15:30 CT
Approved by (IC): Rachel Kim, Fri 16:00 CTICS 209 for the board, Sunday (day 3)
INCIDENT STATUS SUMMARY (after ICS 209)
Board update 3, drawn from the 16:30 status summary
As of (date, time, time zone): Sun 16:30 CT
Incident name and number: FRIDAY RENAME, IR-2026-0142
Severity: SEV 1 Type: 2
Incident Commander: Rachel Kim (days), Sam Okafor (nights)
What is affected: Order entry has been out of service again since
09:20 today. Shipping labels (since Sat 06:00) and warehouse
management (since Sat 21:30) are restored and in use. The 32
encrypted servers stay isolated as evidence. HR files were copied
out before the encryption.
How bad it is: Contained, and not growing. No new encryption since
Fri 03:40. Shipping restarted Sat 08:00. Since 09:20 today orders go
through the manual process, and shipping runs at about 60% of a
normal Sunday.
What people should do now: Send any outside question about the
incident to the Public Information Officer on duty, (312) 555-0170.
Make no public comment. Discuss the incident by phone.
When it will be mitigated and resolved, if known: Mitigated Fri 03:40.
Order entry back by 21:00 tonight, probable. Every business system
restored by Wed 18:00, probable. Closure waits on the notices to
affected people. Date not yet known.
Changed since board update 2 (Sat 17:30 CT):
1. 09:00: a scoping pass found a second foothold, a domain policy the
attacker created that installs a scheduled task on servers. It
reached 2 restored order entry servers when they rejoined the
domain. They were isolated at 09:20 and the policy removed at
10:05. A check of every domain policy found no others (14:20).
2. Diane Foster approved at 09:45 keeping order entry out of service
until it is rebuilt. It had been in service since Sat 07:00.
Scope: systems affected confirmed 40 suspected 0
accounts confirmed 5 suspected 0
Data: 41 GB copied from the HR file share to an outside storage
service, Thu 23:05 to Fri 01:40 (confirmed Sat 14:00).
Initial access: Tue 21:14, through the VPN, with a contractor's
password. That account had no second factor.
Containment status: The attacker's 5 accounts disabled. Tier 0
credentials rotated, with KRBTGT reset twice, by Sat 06:20. Internet
egress on the allow list. Every VPN account has required a second
factor since Sat 02:00.
Objectives this period, and progress on each:
1. Every domain policy and scheduled task checked against the
baseline, and each unknown one removed with evidence kept, by
15:00: met at 14:20.
2. Order entry servers rebuilt from trusted media and through the
pre-restoration checks by 19:00: on track, 3 of 4 done.
3. Scope of the data review agreed with counsel by 18:00: on track.
Assessments:
1. The attacker has no access now. Probable: no attacker sign-ins or
outside connections since Sat 06:30, including from the 2 servers
found today, and the policy check found nothing more.
2. No customer or payment data was taken. Probable: every transfer
found came from the HR share. Proxy logs for Wednesday are
missing.
Still unknown: how many people are in the copied files, and where they
live. Expected Wed, from counsel's review.
Outside parties engaged: counsel (Fri 04:30), insurer (Fri 08:10),
Halyard IR (Fri 11:00), FBI field office (Sat 11:00, through counsel).
Notifications made, and due:
Made: insurer Fri 08:10, by Finance/Admin, inside the policy's
72-hour notice clause. FBI field office Sat 11:00, by counsel.
All staff Sat 18:00, told that HR files were copied, in a notice
counsel cleared and the chief executive approved.
Due: notices to each affected person, and to state attorneys general
where state law requires. Counsel sets each date once the review
names the people and their states.
Costs to date (Finance/Admin, Sun 12:00 CT):
Halyard IR $168,000 of $250,000 approved
Outside counsel $54,000
Overtime and contractors $61,000
Hardware and storage $38,000
Total $321,000. Insurance claim open.
Decisions needed from leadership: none from the board. The executive
group decides Mon 09:00 on raising the Halyard IR approval to
$400,000 for the data review.
Reviewed by counsel: Marcus Hale, Sun 17:10 CT
Approved by (IC): Rachel Kim, Sun 17:15 CT
Sent to the board through Diane Foster, Sun 17:30 CT
Next update: board Mon 17:30 CT. Executives every 2 hours, next 18:30.The filled forms follow the plain-text layouts on Forms, which adapt FEMA's NIMS ICS forms. FEMA's ICS 205 lists radio channels. The one here lists voice, chat and phone channels.
What to notice
- Every objective has an outcome, a measure and a time, and every assignment names the objective it serves.
- Severity is declared in the first briefing, and it sets the update cadence of every 30 minutes until encryption stopped at 03:40 and every 2 hours after, as in the update schedule. The ICS 209 answers the four questions every update answers, in the same order, and ends with the next update time.
- The decisions the executives must make are listed with options, and nothing else is asked of them.
- Command changes with the shift. Sam Okafor commands the nights and Rachel Kim the days, so nobody is on duty for more than one period plus handover.
- The delegation of authority names both Incident Commanders, so the same limits pass with command at every shift change. Anything above them goes to the executive on an ICS 213, as in the executive decision request, and the answer is kept with its time.
- The ICS 215 sets what each group needs against what it has. The need column became the resource orders, and each group's block became its ICS 204. The ICS 215A checked every assignment for risk to people, the plant, evidence and the business before the planning meeting.
- The ICS 205 gives every channel a backup and an owner, and a member joins a channel only after a call back to the offline roster. The ICS 208 carries the shift limit and the plant sign-off rule to everyone on shift.
- Encrypted servers stay powered on and isolated as evidence while the Rebuild group restores into a separate network.
- The board update on day 3 comes from the same status summary as the executive updates. It says what changed since the last one, keeps assessments apart from facts, lists costs, and goes to counsel before it is sent, as in board and government reporting.